Assessment of Competition in EU Liberalised Energy Markets in 2016 by Kádár-Horváth, Ágnes
'Club of Economics in Miskolc' TMP Vol.13., Nr. 2., pp. 35-44. 2017.   http://dx.doi.org/10.18096/TMP.2017.02.04 
 35 
Assessment of Competition in EU Liberalised 
Energy Markets in 2016 
ÁGNES KÁDÁR-HORVÁTH, Ph.D. 
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR 
UNIVERSITY OF MISKOLC 
e-mail: vgthagi@uni-miskolc.hu 
SUMMARY 
The liberalisation of gas and electricity markets had been achieved in almost all EU Member States by the end of the last 
century. It basically aimed at bringing competition into energy markets and benefiting from its favourable impacts. 
However, initial experiences showed that markets suffered from limited competition. The objective of this article is to give 
a brief assessment of the current market competition with special attention to two fundamental issues related to 
undistorted competition: unbundling of activities and developments in market concentration. The analysis shows that 
significant progress has been achieved in the unbundling of activities over the past few years. However, the market 
concentration in the retail segment in most Member States is still high (based on the HHI, C3, the number of undertakings 
with a market share over 5 percent, and the ARCI indicators). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Gas and electricity markets have undergone significant 
changes over the last decades. We have witnessed the 
beginning of market liberalisation processes. By the late 
2000s (earlier in some countries, later in others) energy 
markets in both sectors had been opened up to competition 
in almost all EU Member States. Liberalisation basically 
aimed at bringing competition into energy markets and 
thereby benefiting from its favourable impacts. However, 
the conducted analyses proved that structural reforms 
resulted in only limited competition according to the 
earlier experiences. The emergence of vertically integrated 
transnational market players encompassing cross-border 
or even cross-sectoral value chains of the whole sector led 
to significant impediments to the development of effective 
competition. Apart from high market concentrations, 
insufficient unbundling of network activities was another 
factor that restricted competition. Both implicit cross-
financing opportunities and the hidden barriers to network 
access hindered the evolution of undistorted competition 
and enhanced the possibility to generate extra profit for 
energy market players already dominant in energy markets 
(Kádárné Horváth 2012).  
THE AIM AND STRUCTURE 
OF THE STUDY AND THE 
METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
This article aims at providing a brief assessment of the 
current competition with special attention to two 
fundamental issues related to undistorted competition: the 
unbundling of activities and the development of market 
concentration. The article consists of two major content 
parts. 
The first part deals with issues related to unbundling of 
activities. To this end, the EU regulatory background 
related to unbundling is presented. In addition, the 
unbundling models applied in corporate practices in the 
EU member states are also introduced.   Furthermore, the 
compliance of TSO and DSO systems with unbundling 
requirements is evaluated. The issues are presented within 
the framework of a secondary research study. This article 
provides a summary of the chapters of EU directives 
related to the topic, the main findings of the surveys 
conducted by CEER (2016a,b) and the data on certification 
procedures until February 2016 released by European 
Commission.  
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Table 1 
Unbundling requirements in the EU legislation 
Energy Package Sector Directive* Unbundling transmission system operators   
Unbundling 
distribution system 
operators   
1st energy 
package 
electricity 96/92/EC accounting accounting 
natural gas 98/30/ EC accounting accounting 
2nd energy 
package 
electricity 2003/54/ EC legal, functional, 
decision-making 
legal, functional, 
decision-making 
natural gas 2003/55/ EC legal, functional, 
decision-making 
legal, functional, 
decision-making 
3rd  energy 
package 
electricity 2009/72/ EC ownership or ISO or ITO legal, functional, 
decision-making 
natural gas 2009/73/ EC ownership or ISO or ITO legal, functional, 
decision-making 
*The exact and complete name of the directive is indicated in the references 
Source: the author’s own construction based on the directives 
The second major content part of the article evaluates 
market concentration on retail electricity and gas markets. 
Several indicators were used for the evaluation. Apart from 
the Herfindahl-Hirshmann index (HHI), the concentration 
rate (C3), the number of companies with over 5% of 
market share and the ACER Retail Competition Index 
(ARCI) were used for investigating the market 
concentration and competitive situation in the UE member 
states. 
UNBUNDLING OF ACTIVITIES - 
REGULATORY BACKGROUND 
For undistorted competition, network access – which 
was in a natural monopolistic state (transmission and 
distribution networks) – needed to become non-
discriminatory and fairly priced for competitors. Thus, an 
appropriate regulatory environment had to be developed. 
The core legislative agenda included such items as 
fulfilling the obligation of granting network access, setting 
access charges by competent authorities and unbundling 
the activities of vertically integrated undertakings. The 
European Union created three legislative packages 
(directives) where the objectives and phases of energy 
liberalisation were formulated. These directives stipulated 
the requirements related to separation of production and 
supply activities from network operations.  
Table 1 shows that in the first legislative package the 
unbundling rules stipulated the accounting unbundling in 
case of both transmission and distribution networks 
(96/92/ EC, 98/30/ EC Directives). The second energy 
package regulated a full legal, organisational and decision-
making unbundling (legal and functional unbundling) of 
networks while keeping accounting unbundling 
requirements. However, these formulated requirements 
were insufficient because they failed to grant non-
discriminatory network access and to promote network 
investments and allowed cross-financing. According to 
Illés (2000) the problem that cross-financing faces is that 
’An undertaking or an interpreter conducting activities 
outsourced to several undertakings has great interest in 
manipulating cost information and within this in 
considerably increasing costs that are related to fees for 
network use and in using various tricks to pass costs 
associated with activities performed in the private sector to 
others. The point is that the costs shifted to networks are 
financed by others, whereas the activities of actors – a part 
of whose costs have been passed on to others – become 
less expensive and, in this way, these actors gain an unfair 
competitive advantage over other actors.’ (Illés 2000, pp. 
33-34, my translation). Thus, the conditions for the 
evolution of non-distorted competition were not created.   
In order to safeguard fair competition, the European 
Union then called for ownership unbundling at 
transmission level, which means that network owners 
either in their own capacity or through their interests shall 
not exercise any other activities in the energy market. 
Literally speaking, they must operate independently from 
all market players. This requirement gave rise to heated 
debates because of the underlying extensive ownership 
concentration. As a result of these debates, these 
requirements were fine-tuned and the third energy package 
provided three theoretical models for unbundling 
(2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC directives) depending on the 
preferences of individual EU countries. The three models 
(based on Directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC, 
Hungarian Energy Office (MEH) 2011, Vince in Valentiny 
et al. 2011) are as follows: 
 ownership unbundling: the system operator is at the 
same time the network owner without any generation, 
supply or commercial interests in the energy sector; 
 Independent System Operator (ISO): a system operator 
without any generation, supply or commercial interests 
is only a network operator, not its owner. The grid 
owner is a vertically integrated undertaking operating 
in the energy market. 
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 Independent Transmission Operator (ITO): a member 
of a vertically integrated group of undertakings that 
operates in the energy market. This group of 
undertakings is the network owner.  
In order to secure undistorted competition, both the 
appointment of system operator and the operation of the 
system are regulated in detail and strictly verified. After 
transmission operators have been certified by national 
regulatory authorities, they are approved and designated as 
transmission system operators by Member States. The 
designation of transmission system operators must be 
notified to the Commission and published in the Official 
Journal of the European Union. Transmission system 
operators notify to the regulatory authority any planned 
transaction that may require a reassessment of their 
compliance with the requirements. The regulatory 
authorities, on the other hand, monitor the continuing 
compliance of transmission system operators with the 
requirements. Transmission system operators have to 
comply with organizational and conflicts of interest rules 
as well as accounting and information unbundling rules. In 
the case of ISO and ITO models, vertically integrated 
undertakings can maintain their ownership of network 
assets while ensuring effective separation of interests on 
condition that independent system or transmission 
operators perform all the activities related to system 
operation (pursuant to Article 16 of Directive 
2009/72/EC). As regards these models, compliance with 
further provisions is required. The strictest provisions are 
related to the ITO model (including communication, 
brand-building and information systems, requesting 
consultancy services, independent accounting, human 
resources and management). Rules are addressed in detail 
in 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC directives.  
Member States are given the choice provided the 
undertaking owning a transmission system was part of a 
vertically integrated undertaking on 3 September 2009, on 
the date when this directive came into force. Systems set 
up or owned after that date must comply with ownership 
unbundling provisions. Member States can opt for full 
ownership unbundling. In this case an undertaking has no 
right to set up an independent system operator or an 
independent transmission operator. Mention should be 
made that the ITO+ model is applicable in special cases. 
The directives stipulate the derogations and exemptions 
from relevant provisions such as isolated markets, 
emerging markets, etc. (See 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC 
directives). 
Apart from transmission networks, mention should be 
made of Distribution System Operators (DSO), which play 
an essential role in the energy sector and act as an interface 
with retail markets. Legal and functioning unbundling of 
distribution system operators was required, pursuant to 
Directives 2003/54/EC and 2003/55/EC, from 1 July 2007.  
The third energy package did not stipulate ownership 
unbundling, so legal, organizational and decision-making 
unbundling requirements (legal and functional 
unbundling) remained. Accounting unbundling is an 
essential requirement and must comply with numerous 
conflicts of interest and other rules in order to secure 
undistorted competition. However, this article does not 
aim at addressing these rules. Member States may have 
decided not to apply unbundling requirements to 
integrated electricity undertakings serving less 
than  100,000 connected customers, or serving small 
isolated systems. Member States had to comply with 
unbundling requirements stipulated in the third energy 
package by 3 March 2011.  
UNBUNDLING MODELS IN THE EU 
MEMBER STATES IN 2016 
The Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) 
evaluated the compliance of both transmission system 
operators (TSO) and distribution system operators (DSO) 
with unbundling requirements in the European Union in 
2016 based on the February data (CEER 2016a and CEER 
2016b). The data were obtained via a survey of national 
energy regulatory authorities of 26 EU countries 
(excepting Bulgaria and Ireland).   
Compliance of Transmission System Operators 
(TSOs) with Unbundling Requirements 
European Commission data (European Commission 
2016) show that 109 certification procedures (51 in the 
electricity sector and 58 in the gas sector) were conducted 
in the EU until February 2016. As a result, transmission 
system operators (TSO) complied with unbundling 
requirements stipulated in the third energy package.  
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Table 2 
Unbundling model of transmission system operators in the EU in 2016 
Source: the author’s own construction based on the certificates issued on 14 February (European Commission 
2016 cited in CEER 2016a) 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/Received%20notifications%20corr.xlsx 
Table 2 clearly illustrates that in the electricity sector 
68.6% of certified transmission system operators referred 
to full ownership unbundling (In 2009 this ratio amounted 
only to 40.5% according to EC data 2011, pp. 36-39). 
About 11.8% of transmission systems were certified under 
the Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) model, 
5.9% were granted certifications under the Independent 
System Operator (ISO) model and 13.7% were certified 
under other models. As for the natural gas sector, full 
ownership unbundling was implemented in about 39.7% 
of certified transmission system operators (in 2009 this 
ratio amounted to only 16.9% according to EC data 2011, 
pp. 36-39). About 44.8% of transmission systems were 
certified under the Independent Transmission Operator 
(ITO) model, 10.3% were granted certifications under the 
Independent System Operator (ISO) model and 5.2% were 
certified under other models.  
  
Number of 
TSO-s
Ownership 
unbundling ITO ISO Others
Number of 
TSO-s
Ownership 
unbundling ITO ISO Others
Austria 3 1 1 1 0 6 0 4 1 1
Belgium 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0
Bulgaria 1 0 1 0 0
Cyprus
Check Republic 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Denmark 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
United Kingdom 21 17 0 0 4 5 4 0 0 1
Estonia 1 1 0 0 0
Finland 1 1 0 0 0
France 1 0 1 0 0 3 1 2 0 0
Greece 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
the Netherlands 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1
Croatia
Ireland 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Poland 2 1 0 0 1 3 1 0 2 0
Latvia 1 0 0 1 0
Lithuania 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Luxemburg
Hungary 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 0
Malta
Germany 6 3 2 0 1 15 4 11 0 0
Italy 1 1 0 0 0 4 2 2 0 0
Portugal 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Romania 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Spain 1 1 0 0 0 5 3 0 2 0
Sweden 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Slovakia 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Slovenia 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Total 51 35 6 3 7 58 23 26 6 3
Proportion (% ) 100 68.6 11.8 5.9 13.7 100 39.7 44.8 10.3 5.2
Derogation (temporary) : isolated market
Electricity Natural gas
No data
Derogation Derogation: isolated market, emerging market
Derogation (temporary) : isolated market
Derogation (temporary) : isolated market
Derogation
Derogation
Derogation
Derogation
No data No data
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Table 3 
Ownership structure of transmission systems 
 Electricity Natural gas 
100% public ownership  Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Sweden, the Netherlands 
Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia 
> 51% public ownership Austria, Finland, France, 
Lithuania, Romania 
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, 
Greece, Italy, Lithuania, 
Slovakia 
> 51% private ownership Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Spain 
Austria, France, Luxembourg, 
Spain, Sweden 
100% private ownership United Kingdom, Portugal Czech Republic, United 
Kingdom, Portugal, Latvia 
* In Germany there are undertakings with mixed public and private ownership in both sectors. No 
information is available about other member states. 
Source: the author’s own construction based on CEER (2016a) 
Table 3 clearly shows that the TSO public ownership 
is stronger in the electricity sector than in the gas sector. In 
more than half of the Member States the TSO ownership 
structure is public and amounts to 100%. Only two 
Member States have a full private ownership structure for 
their TSOs and in other Member States there is mixed 
public and private ownership for electricity TSOs. Only in 
four EU countries do gas TSOs have a public ownership of 
100%. In other countries most of the TSO ownership 
structure is private. According to CEER 2016a, the 
ownership structure of the TSO has changed in two thirds 
of the Member States since the third energy package 
entered into force.  
The CEER 2016a study investigated monitoring tools 
used by National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to ensure 
compliance of TSOs with unbundling requirements and 
monitored issues and  measures taken by NRAs in cases 
where non-compliance with unbundling rules were 
experienced. The study found that the three unbundling 
models proposed in the Third Energy Package (including 
the ‘most relaxed’ ITO model) and the related unbundling 
requirements are sufficient to ensure effective unbundling 
of network operation from production and supply 
activities. 
Compliance with Unbundling Requirements of 
Distribution System Operators (DSOs) 
The basic functional model of distribution system 
operators is similar in all Member States. However, the 
number of distribution system operators, their size, 
technical parameters and the profile of their activities 
differ greatly in these Member States. In 2015 there were 
714 distribution system operators in the German gas 
market, out of which 689 supplied less than 100,000 
connected customers. As many as 803 out of 880 German 
electricity DSOs serviced less than 100,000 connected 
customers. In several countries the number of DSOs was 
below 10. As for distribution systems, the Energy Package 
imposed the obligation of accounting unbundling as well 
as legal and functional unbundling requirements. 
Unbundling of accounts is mandatory for all distribution 
system operators. However, exemptions from legal and 
functional unbundling rules may be granted. For example, 
DSOs servicing less than 100,000 connected customers are 
entitled to exemptions. Member States transposed the rules 
into their national legislation in different ways. For 
example, in the Netherlands the implementation of full 
DSO ownership unbundling is required. In other countries 
all DSOs including those with less than 100,000 connected 
customers are obliged to implement legal and functional 
unbundling. More than half of the Member States grant 
small DSOs exemptions from unbundling rules. Several 
Member States have adjusted the threshold of 100,000 
connected customers to their own circumstances. There are 
states where different requirements are imposed on gas and 
on electricity. In Malta and Cyprus only accounting 
unbundling is required due to their special situation 
(isolated and emerging market). In the majority of Member 
States distribution systems belong to vertically integrated 
undertakings.  
The CEER 2016b study reported that, in general, the 
legal form chosen for distribution system operators 
guarantees a sufficient level of independence. Distribution 
system operators have sufficient financial resources at 
their disposal to ensure full independence and decision-
making power. The study highlights some weaknesses in 
branding and communication policies, namely, that 
corporate identity is not fully separated from the integrated 
company group. The role of regulatory authorities in 
monitoring and control is an important factor in ensuring 
compliance programmes (CEER 2016b). 
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MARKET CONCENTRATION IN 
RETAIL MARKETS – 
METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND 
One of the major barriers to creating a real competitive 
business environment is vertical integration encompassing 
the whole value chain of the sector, that is, the emergence 
of dominant market players. In this sub-chapter the degree 
of market concentration and the competition level in the 
retail market is investigated.  
Several indicators were taken into consideration when 
the market concentration was measured. First, the values 
of the frequently used Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) 
were analysed. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is 
calculated by adding the squares of the percentage market 
share of each market player. Its value ranges between 0 
and 10,000.  The higher the value of the indicator is, the 
more concentrated the market is. The index can be as high 
as 10,000 if there is only one market player in a monopoly 
position on the supplier side. When the index value is over 
5,000, the market concentration is very high. Even a 1,800 
index value is said to be high. This value can be considered 
to be a threshold, as market concentration above this value 
may lead to the possibility of abusing a dominant market 
position. A Herfindahl-Hirschman index value between 
1,000 and 1,800 indicates a moderately concentrated 
market. If this index is below 1,000, the market is 
deconcentrated (Kovács, 2011).   
In order to gain a more complete picture of market 
concentration, further indicators for assessing market 
competition are also worth considering. This assessment 
focuses on conventional market concentration indicators 
with an emphasis on three largest corporate market shares 
(C3 indicator) and on a number of undertakings with a 
market share over 5%. In addition, this study presents a 
compounded indicator produced to assess the relative level 
of competition (the ACER Retail Competition Index). 
Before analysing the data, mention should be made of 
ARCI methodology. For more details, see the description 
of the ARCI methodology and its values in detail in IPA 
(2015) and ACER/CEER (2016). 
The ACER Retail Competition Index and its 9 sub-
indicators assess the relative level of competition in retail 
energy markets at a national level in the household 
segment in EU Member States. This composite index 
consists of the following indicators (based on IPA 2015 
and ACER/CEER 2016): 
1. Market structure indicators: analyse market 
concentration ratio 
a. market share of the three largest undertakings (C3) 
expressed as percentages (2015): these data are 
normalised into a range of 0 to 10. A score of 10 
corresponds to 30% or below and indicates a 
competitive market. If the value ranges between 
30% and 100%, the potential value of the 
normalised value decreases linearly to zero. A score 
of 0 shows that the value of the C3 indicator is 
100%.  
b. the number of undertakings with a market share 
over 5% (2015): This indicator is computed on a 
scale ranging from 0 to 10 (0 indicates monopoly 
of an undertaking, 10 means 10 or more suppliers) 
c. difficulties of price comparison (2015): The price 
comparison is based on customer surveys. A ten-
point scale is used for estimating the ease or 
difficulty of comparing service and product prices 
set by different retailers. (0 indicates the greatest 
ease, 10 means that comparing is difficult). 
Normalisation is not required. This component is 
subjective.  
2. Market behaviour indicators: 
a. average rate of customers switching suppliers 
(external) and switching tariffs activities (internal) 
(2011-2015): This indicator shows what percentage 
of customers have switched energy suppliers or 
switched to different tariffs with historically 
incumbent suppliers.  Higher switching rates and 
activities indicate greater competition. However, 
lower rates do not necessarily mean limited 
competition. (The rates were converted to linearly 
increasing scores on a scale from 0 to 10. Zero 
indicates that the switching rate is 0%, 10 means 
that the switching rate is 20% or above. It is 
assumed that such a switching rate has no further 
impact on competition. (I think this indicator can be 
applied to characterise competition, with certain 
reservations, in Member States applying regulated 
prices.)   
b. consumer inactivity: This indicator expresses the 
proportion of consumers who do not switch 
suppliers, but remain with an incumbent supplier 
(2015). These data are estimated based on the 
supplier’s market share. Normalisation is a 
conversion to a scale ranging between 0 and 10.  10 
indicates that 1/3 of the consumers switched to non-
incumbent suppliers, while 0 shows that 100% of 
consumers remained with incumbent suppliers. (I 
think this indicator can be applied for 
characterising competition with certain 
reservations in Member States applying regulated 
prices.)  
c. average net market entry (2013-2015): This 
indicator shows a change in the number of domestic 
suppliers, namely, market entries minus market 
exits. This indicator is problematic. (For example, 
the average net market entry is 0 if there are no 
market entries or market exits, or if the same 
number of undertakings have entered or exited the 
market). (Normalisation on a scale ranging between 
0 and 10: 0 means that the net market entry is zero, 
10 indicates that the net market entry is 5 or more. 
The normalised score between two values increases 
linearly.)  
d. Number of offers per supplier (2015) (examined in 
the European capital cities): This indicator shows 
the number of offers divided by the number of 
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service providers. On a scale ranging between 0 and 
10, 0 means one offer per supplier, 10 indicate five 
or more offers per supplier). 
3. Competition performance indicators: 
a. customer satisfaction indicator: This indicator 
measures how markets meet customer expectations 
(2015) in terms of service and product prices and 
quality offered by suppliers. This indicator is based 
on a consumer survey and is a very subjective 
element. Normalisation is not required. A scale of 
0 to 10 is used for evaluation (0 – low, 10 – 
extremely high satisfaction). 
b. average price margin: This indicator shows the 
difference between wholesale and retail prices. 
Average price margin = (retail price - wholesale 
price)/retail price. In the case of retail prices, 
average retail prices are used as the basis for 
calculations. In the case of wholesale prices, the 
energy component of the retail price is considered. 
It should be noted that a low average price margin 
may result from regulated end-user prices and not 
necessarily from market competition. This fact is 
taken into consideration when the data are 
normalised. Normalisation uses the proportion of 
consumers on non-regulated prices. (Based on IPA 
(2015) and ACER/CEER (2016)) 
Certain indicators were normalised and computed on a 
scale from 0 to 10. Then each indicator was assigned equal 
weight and a single weighted composite index was 
produced. The ARCI value ranges on a scale from 0 to 10. 
A zero score indicates that the level of competition is low. 
The higher the score is, the stronger the competition 
experienced in the market. The index has all the general 
critical features of composite indices, which should be 
taken into account in the evaluation of the obtained results. 
ARCI indicates that the competition level in the energy 
retail market in Member States varies. Energy markets can 
be ranked based on this index. By examining each 
component of the nine sub-indicators, it becomes evident 
which areas need to be improved in individual Member 
States.  To this end, the present assessment does not intend 
to present further details related to this issue (see IPA 
(2015) and ACER/CEER (2016)). 
EVALUATION OF THE MARKET 
CONCENTRATION IN ENERGY 
RETAIL MARKETS 
HHI clearly shows that (See: Table 4) there is market 
deconcentration in both sectors only in Germany. There is 
moderate market concentration in several Member States. 
In the majority of  Member States the HHI in retail is high 
or very high in both sectors.  
Table 5 presents the ARCI, ranking based on ARCI, 
reliability of data for ARCI, the market share of the three 
largest suppliers (C3) and the number of undertakings with 
a market share over 5% in the electricity and gas sectors in 
the EU Member States in 2015. Since Malta and Cyprus 
do not have retail gas markets and in Finland and Sweden 
the gas retail market is small, the data on this market are 
incomplete.  
Table 4 
HHI value in electricity and gas retail markets based on the data of 2012 
2012* Electricity Gas 
Very high market 
concentration 
(HHI>5000) 
Cyprus (10000), Estonia, Greece, 
Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta 
(10000), Portugal 
Estonia, Latvia (10000), Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Poland 
High market 
concentration 
(HHI 1800-5000) 
Belgium, Croatia, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Spain, 
Netherlands 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Ireland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom 
Moderate market 
concentration  
(HHI 1000-1800) 
Austria, Hungary, Romania, 
Slovenia, United Kingdom 
Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Italy 
Market deconcentration  
(HHI<1000) Germany Germany 
* In case of missing Member States data were not available. 
Source: the author’s own construction based on European Commission (2014)  
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Table 5 
Indicators measuring market competition in the electricity and gas sectors 
in the EU Member States in 2015 
Source: the author’s own construction based on IPA 2015 és ACER/CEER 2016 
Conventional market concentration indices show that 
retail markets are still relatively highly concentrated. The 
market share of the three largest suppliers (C3) in the 
majority of EU Member States amounts to about 70-100% 
in both sectors. The grey areas in Table 5 show values 
below 70%. The number of undertakings with a market 
share over 5% is also small in almost all Member States. 
According to the ARCI created to compare relative 
levels of competition in energy retail markets, the 
competition in the electricity market is the highest in 
Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Czech 
Republic and the Netherlands. In the gas retail market the 
competition is the most advanced in Belgium, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and the Czech 
Republic. The level of competition in the electricity market 
is the lowest in Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia and 
Latvia. As for the gas market, it is the weakest in Greece, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Poland. 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the present assessment show that a 
significant improvement has been made in the unbundling 
of activities over the past few years. Full ownership 
unbundling has been implemented in a large proportion of 
transmission systems. However, this proportion varies in 
the gas and electric sectors. As for the other two models, 
ISO and ITO, the introduced stringent regulations and the 
tight control exercised by authorities create conditions for 
the evolution of undistorted competition. The studies 
referred to show that legal and functional unbundling 
stipulated for distribution system operators and 
supplemented by strict regulation regimes is considered to 
be appropriate.  
A significant scope for improvement remains in market 
concentration. As for the retail energy markets, the market 
concentration indices still show a high level of 
concentration both in the electricity and gas markets, 
despite the fact that the market competition increased in 
2015 compared to the initial period (beginning from years  
2007-2008). 
ARCI
Ranking 
based on 
ARCI
Reliability 
of data 
for ARCI
C3
Number of 
undertakings 
with a market 
share over 5% 
ARCI
Ranking 
based on 
ARCI
Reliability of 
data for 
ARCI
C3
Number of 
undertakings 
with a market 
share over 5% 
Austria 6 7 High 60 5 4.5 11 Moderate > 70 3
Belgium 5.7 8 High >70 5 6.8 1 High >70 5
Bulgaria 2.2 27 Moderate 100 3 2.1 22 High 100 2
Cyprus 2.4 26 Moderate 100 1 - - - - -
Czech Republic 6.1 4 High >70 5 5.5 5 High >70 5
Denmark 5.6 9 Moderate >40 6 3.5 13 High >90 3
United Kingdom 6.8 3 High >50 6 6 2 Moderate >60 6
Estonia 5.3 11 High >80 2 4.1 12 Moderate >90 1
Finland 7.7 1 Moderate 40 4 - - - >90 1
France 3.3 20 High >90 2 3.5 14 High >90 2
Greece 2 28 High 100 1 2 24 High 100 1
the Netherlands 6.1 5 High >70 3 5.8 4 High >70 3
Croatia 2.5 25 High >90 1 2.5 19 High >60 3
Ireland 5.1 13 High 90 4 5.1 9 High >80 5
Poland 5.1 14 High >70 5 2.2 20 High 100 1
Latvia 4 18 High >90 1 2 23 High 100 1
Lithuania 2.9 24 High 100 1 2.1 21 High 100 1
Luxembourg 4 19 High >90 2 3.1 16 High 100 2
Hungary 3.1 21 High >70 2 3 17 High 100 4
Malta 3.1 22 Low 100 1 - - - - -
Germany 6.1 6 High 40 4 6 3 High >20 3
Italy 5.2 12 High >80 1 5.3 6 High >50 4
Portugal 5.5 10 High >90 2 5.2 7 High 100 3
Romania 4.2 17 High >80 4 2.8 18 High >90 2
Spain 4.5 16 High 90 3 5..2 8 High >80 4
Sweden 7.2 2 Moderate >40 4 - - - >80 4
Slovakia 3.1 23 High >80 3 3.2 15 High >90 3
Slovenia 5 15 High >60 7 5 10 High >60 5
Electricity Natural gas
Country
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